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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION SCTT-01

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Argentina
Terrorism*

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 ISO-00 SY-05 EB-07 COME-00 SS-15 NSC-05
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R 071245Z JUL 76
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6252

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 4420

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASCC, PNS, AR
SUBJECT: REPEATED THREATS TO CHRYSLER CORP. PERSONNEL

1. ON JULY 2, 1976, FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO THE LEGAL ATTACHE BY HERB LESHINSKY, MANAGING DIRECTOR, CHRYSLER CORP., BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA: DURING THE PAST WEEK, FOUR CHRYSLER EXECUTIVES RECEIVED THREATENING MIMEOGRAPHED LETTERS FROM THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. THE MIMEOGRAPHED MESSAGE RECEIVED BY THE CHRYSLER EXECUTIVES INDICATES THAT THIS MESSAGE HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO 2000 INDIVIDUALS IN ARGENTINA. ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE TO MEET WITH LESHINSKY ON 7/5/76, AT WHICH TIME HE WILL PROVIDE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE.

2. LESHINSKY ADVISED THAT PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR BRAZIL ON CHRYSLER BUSINESS APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AGO, INFORMATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED THAT A TERRORIST CELL HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY SECURITY FORCES, THUS APPARENTLY ABORTING THE PLAN. LESHINSKY INDICATED THAT THE KIDNAP PLAN WAS ASSIGNED A CODE NAME AND WAS EXTREMELY DETAILED. LESHINSKY INDICATED HE WOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DURING THE 7/6/76 MEETING.

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BUENOS 94420 071350Z

3. LESHINSKY INDICATED THAT ON 6/30/76, CHRYSLER SPIRITED AN EXECUTIVE OUT OF THE COUNTRY, AGAINST WHOM SURVEILLANCE HAD BEEN DETECTED FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME. LESHINSKY INDICATED THAT CHRYSLER WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE SURVEILLANCE HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT BY TERRORISTS OR COMMON CRIMINALS.

4. RSO COMMENTS: HEADS OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS, BOTH US CITIZENS AND ARGENTINES, HAVE CONTINUALLY RECEIVED THREATS FROM TERRORISTS ELEMENTS. SUCH THREATS CANNOT BE TAKEN LIGHTLY SINCE PREVIOUS VICTIMS OF BOTH ASSASSINATIONS AND KIDNAPPINGS HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO RECEIVE REPEATED THREATS PRIOR THE INCIDENT OCCUR.
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PAGE 01 BUENOS 02738 271221Z

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-02 PH-24 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 L-03 CIAE-00
DUDE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 USIA-06 PRS-01 SY-05
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R 262112Z APR 76
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5395

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 2738

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, SHUM, ASEC, AR
SUBJECT: GENERAL VIDELA BEGINS TO CONTROL RIGHT-WING TERRORISM?
REF: BUENOS AIRES 2528

1. FOLLOWING VIDELA MEETING WITH SENIOR GENERALS IN WHICH HE MADE CLEAR HIS DESIRE THAT RIGHT-WING TERRORISM BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL (REF A), LEGATT SOURCES REPORT THAT CORPS COMMANDERS, TAKING VIDELA'S ADMONITIONS TO HEART, CRACKED DOWN ON POLICE UNITS WHICH HAD BEEN CARRYING OUT EXTRALEGAL REPRISALS AGAINST SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. ARMY OFFICERS WENT SO FAR AS TO REMOVE FROM POLICE CONTROL THOSE ARRESTED TERRORISTS WHO SHOWED SIGNS OF MALTREATMENT, TRANSFERRING THEM TO MILITARY BASES WHERE THEY ARE NOW RECEIVING PROPER MEDICAL ATTENTION. IN ADDITION, MILITARY COMMANDERS ARE NOW ENGAGED IN PRODUCING ON PRIORITY BASIS COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF THOSE PERSONS WHO HAVE BEEN DETAINED ON POLITICAL, SUBVERSIVE OR CORRUPTION CHARGES SINCE COUP. WHILE UNDER PRESSURE FROM VIDELA TO PRODUCE LIST BY END OF THIS WEEK, IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THERE MAY BE SOME SLIPPAGE AS MILITARY COMMANDERS TRY TO FIND OUT WHAT HAPPENED TO THOSE PERSONS ORIGINALLY LISTED AS ARRESTED BY POLICE BUT NOW UNACCOUNTED FOR.

2. ON APRIL 23 A GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT IN THE FUTURE THE PRESS COULD NOT, WITHOUT PRIOR AUTHORIZATION FROM

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PAGE 02 BUENOS 02738 271221Z

~~THE GOVERNMENT, PUBLISH ACCOUNTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS OR PUBLISH
REPORTS ABOUT ROOTS, FRONTS AND PRESUMED TO BE THE WORK OF SOME
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. THE SPOKESMAN WHO RELEASED THIS INFORMATI-
ON NOTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT FELT ITSELF TO BE "IN A STATE
OF WAR" AND WAS TAKING THIS ACTION TO DENY TERRORISTS PUBLICITY
THEY NEED TO KEEP THEIR MOVEMENTS GOING. IT WAS NOT, HE EMPHASIZED,
RELATED TO ANY BROADER ISSUE OF PRESS CENSORSHIP.~~

3. COMMENT: FACT THAT ARMY COMMANDERS HAVE MOVED TO CURB
RIGHT-WING VIOLENCE AND HAVE GONE SO FAR AS TO ACT AGAINST
POLICE SEEN AS VERY ENCOURAGING SIGN BY POLITICAL OBSERVERS.
EMBASSY POLITICAL CONTACTS ACROSS BROAD SPECTRUM OF PARTIES
CONTINUE TO VOICE THEIR "SURPRISE" THAT MILITARY ACTING IN
SUCH MODERATE MANNER. WITH REGARD TO PRESS, REPORTING OF
TERRORISM IS CAUSING CONCERN AS OBSERVERS WAIT TO SEE HOW THIS
NEW ACTION WILL WORK OUT IN PRACTICE.

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INFO 007-01 190-20 SY-05 SCOT-01 AID-03 ACR-03 US11-00

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E.O. 11652: SDS
TAGS: ASSE, PINS, RPA, AS
SUBJECT: ELIMINATION TARGET PROFILE DIPLOMAT

DEPARTMENT FOR JOURNAL, DITEL

1. FOLLOWING THE BYIPACIAL AGREEMENT OF 1970, A SAISON MONITOR TO
LEADER, THE EXECUTIVE WATCH COMMITTEE HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE
DANGER TO EMBASSY EMPLOYEES IS HIGHER NOW THAN IN THE PAST
FIVE YEARS. FURTHER, THAT THIS INCREASED THREAT WILL BE TEMPORARY,
"BUT THAT" TO LAST NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS.

3. THE FOLLOWING TEMPORARY (2 TO 5 WEEKS) ACTIONS HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED AND ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY.

4. ALL AMERICANS ARE TO DRASTICALLY CHANGE THEIR DAILY ROUTINES.
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THIS IS BEING DONE BECAUSE 141231Z

THIS INCLUDES VARYING ARRIVAL AT JOINT BY AS MUCH AS FOUR HOURS.

5. WHEN NECESSARY, AMERICANS ARE TO DO THEIR WORK IN THEIR HOMES. THIS SHOULD ALLOW HALF-DAYS IN OFFICE ON EVERY ALTERNATE DATE OF NON-COMMUTING.

6. NON-ESSENTIAL WORK SHOULD BE DELAYED SO EMPLOYEES CAN STAY IN THEIR HOMES.

7. THREE EXTRA PATROL/ESCORT CARS WITH GUARDS ARE BEING PLACED TO PROVIDE FOLLOW-UP AND ESCORT SERVICE. TWO WILL BE PLACED IN SUBURBAN AREA AND ONE IN URBAN DISTRICT. ALL EMPLOYEES ARE TO USE THESE VEHICLES TO REACH FOLLOW-UP THEIR VEHICLE FROM HOME TO TRUCK TRAFFIC FLOW AREA OR AS TRANSPORTATION FROM WORK TO VARIOUS POINTS FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION.

8. A SPECIAL CAR WITH ONE GUARD HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO POLITICAL COUNSELOR AND CONSUL GENERAL. THESE OFFICERS, LIVE NEAR EACH OTHER AND WILL COORDINATE USE OF THE VEHICLE SO THEY MAY VARY THEIR ROUTINE.

9. TWO GUARDS WILL BE PROVIDED FOR TWO MILITARY AND ONE CIVILIAN OFFICER WHOSE FUNCTIONS PLACE THEM IN OPERATIVE DANGER THAN OTHERS. ONE CIVILIAN OFFICER BEING MOVED TO TEMPORARY QUARTERS.

10. ALL EMPLOYEES ARE INSTRUCTED TO CANCEL OR POSTPONE LARGE SOCIAL EVENTS.

11. COUNTRY TEAM MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 14TH WILL BE HELD AT AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.

12. AMBASSADOR WILL'S SCHEDULE IS HELD TO A MINIMUM. HIS PLANS HAD ALREADY INVOLVED TRIP TO U.S. DURING WEEKEND OF JANUARY 14 AND RETURNING JANUARY 24TH.

13. ALL EMPLOYEES WHO CAN ARE ORDERED TO ADVANCE VACATION PLANS TO HAVE THEM OUT OF CITY OR AT LEAST IN THEIR HOMES DURING THIS PERIOD.

14. EMPLOYEES ARE INSTRUCTED TO REMAIN IN THEIR HOMES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. WHILE COMMITTEE DOES NOT FEEL NECESSARY

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PAGE 03 JUNE 65 0620Z 141531Z

ARE PARTICULARLY THREATENED, THEY ARE ENCOURAGED TO STAY
IN THE HOUSE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

1. ADVISE COLLECTOR TO ADVISE ALL ACTIVITIES BEAT THE
COST OF EXTRA PROCEEDINGS SO EACH AGENCY MAY ADV FOR CREDIT TO
COURT OBLIGATIONS ALREADY COMMITTED.

2. AT SUCH AS POSSIBLE, THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE MISSION
WILL NOT WEAR UNIFORMS.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

BO 11652: GDS

TAGS ASEC, PINS, AR

INFO Amembassy Panama
Panama Pass RSS

FROM Amembassy, Buenos Aires

DATE May 14, 1976

SUBJECT Security Watch Committee Meetings, Jan - Feb 1976

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SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

I. On January 12, 1976, a meeting of the Security Watch Committee was called by the A/DCM. Representatives from the following sections or agencies attended POL [redacted] DAO, MILGRP, ADMIN, SY and LEGATT

The RSO brought to the attention of the Committee the fact that a high ranking Montonero (Quieto) had been taken into custody and that this could affect the security posture of the Embassy staff. Other members of the Committee revealed that "Quieto" was in the hands of the military, that the Montoneros were on the alert for defensive purposes and could take action in order to obtain his release. There was a general agreement that the Committee could not identify the nature of the action which possibly would be forthcoming. The possibilities of kidnapping and random assassination were discussed. The RSO pointed out the possibility of an attack on the Residence for the purpose of holding it and the Ambassador until release of "Quieto" was secured. The fact that the garden wall of the grounds of the residence was susceptible to penetration by a group attack was brought to the Committee's attention.

Declassified Case: OX- 52366 Date: 11-02-2013

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AMB RCH111

Clearance Staff (in draft)

DCM Mchaplin

1976 MAY 21 PM 5 06

The Committee agreed the possibility of kidnapping would be the greatest threat. Random assassination was considered a lower level threat. A possible attack on the Residence was considered unlikely because terrorists in this area have no history of such acts and because of the guard force which is present

The fact that copies of the November 1975 issue of NACLA are known to be in Buenos Aires was brought before the Committee. This issue alleged that Embassy members belong to the CIA and identified individuals by name, some are still on the staff

The following was the consensus of the Committee

- A. an immediate danger exists for American staff members
- B. the threat level to staff members is at the highest it has been for several years.
- C. the threat profile of all staff members has increased across the board; therefore, all should take precautions.

Also discussed were the following points:

- A. Missions with a lesser protective program than the American Embassy could have a higher target profile.
- B. The U.S. position on kidnapping is clear, i.e. should a staff member be kidnapped the demands of the terrorists will not be met. Therefore, the taking of a diplomat from another country may appear to be more fruitful to the terrorists since negotiations could be possible
- C. Concern was expressed with respect to military members wearing uniforms.
- D. The Committee agreed that a message should be sent advising the incoming U.S. Military, Inspector General's team it could be necessary to postpone their visit depending on the political climate. The team was to be advised at a later date

The Committee agreed on the following measures to be recommended to the Ambassador:

- A. All Americans are to drastically change their daily routines. This includes varying arrival at work by as much as four hours.
- B. When possible, Americans are to do their work in their homes. This should allow half-days in office or even alternate dates of non-commuting.

- C. Non-essential work should be delayed so employees can stay in their homes
- D. Three extra patrol/escort cars with armed guards are required to provide follow-cars and escort service. Two will be placed in suburban area and one in Federal District. All employees who can will use these vehicles to either follow their vehicle from home to major traffic flow area or as transportation from home to varying points for public transportation.
- E. A special car with one guard to be assigned to political counselor and consul general. These officers live near each other and will coordinate use of the vehicle so they may vary their routine.
- F. Bodyguards to be provided for two Milgroup and whose functions place them in greater danger than others. One Milgrp officer to be moved to temporary quarters.
- G. All employees to be instructed to cancel or postpone large social events.
- H. Country Team meeting scheduled for January 14 to be held at Ambassador's Residence.
- I. Ambassador Hill's scheduled should be held to a minimum. His plans already involved trip to U.S. beginning evening of January 14 and returning January 24.
- J. All employees who can should be urged to advance vacation plans to have them out of the city or at least in their homes during this period.
- K. Employees should be instructed to remain in their homes as much as possible.
- L. Admin Counselor is to advise all agencies asap the total cost of extra procedures so each agency may ask for funding to cover obligations already committed.
- M. As much as possible, the military members of the Mission should not wear uniforms.

The Ambassador joined the meeting and the above mentioned recommendations were presented. The Ambassador advised he would take the recommendations under consideration. He directed the Committee to reconvene on January 13, 1976 for his decision with respect to the recommendations. In addition, he queried the Committee concerning the advisability of approaching the Foreign Office with respect to the elevated

threat level. The Committee advised against this because it could be hazardous to sources of some of the information supplied to the Committee.

[REDACTED]

The meeting was adjourned.

II. On January 13, 1976, the Committee was reconvened. In addition to those present on January 12, the Consul General joined the group, and was briefed on the Committee proceedings of January 12.

The Ambassador and Counselor for Political Affairs reported on a visit to the Papal Nuncio which included his opinion on and observations of the President of the GOA and his opinion of the threat as related to the "Quieto" matter.

The Ambassador advised the Committee that he approved the Security recommendations made on January 12 and that the Department was to be informed of the action being taken. In addition, he directed the Committee to consider the following and advise him of its recommendations:

- A. The upcoming visit of Major General Willis D. Crittenberger, DIA and related receptions.
- B. The target posture of the Legatt, [REDACTED] and the Labatt.
- C. The target posture of members of the military.

E025x1

The Ambassador departed the meeting. The Committee considered the above described points and made the following recommendations:

- A. The Crittenberger trip should continue as planned with the Security Office providing the necessary protection through Federal Police and contract guards.
- B. Labor Attache would work on a half-day broken schedule in the office, performing the remainder of his work away from the Chancery with no set hours.
- C. [REDACTED] who is due to commence leave on 1-25-76, would exercise a wide variation in his work hours and travel habits until that date.
- D. The Legal Attache advised the Committee he would be traveling out of country 80% of the time over the next several weeks. The Committee agreed this would be a reasonable variation of his schedule.
- E. Military personnel would not wear uniforms to their offices and would vary their working times and travel habits.

The RSO informed the Committee that one member of the Milgrp had requested permission to move his family into a hotel for the next two or three weeks. His request was based on the fact that he is an intelligence officer and has worn his uniform displaying the intelligence insignia. In addition, the GOA military headquarters where he works is not well protected and has been bombed. The Milgrp Commander recommended the move and the Committee supported the recommendation.

The Chairman, A/DCM, closed the meeting after informing the Committee he would advise the Ambassador of the above mentioned recommendations.

III. On January 15, 1976, a meeting of the Security Watch Committee was called by the Chargé d'Affaires. Representatives from the following sections and agencies attended; POL, [REDACTED] USIS, ADMIN, SY, LEGATT and DAO. In addition, Lt. Col. Jack Smith, Milgrp, was present. E025x1

A general discussion took place concerning information given the Ambassador by an Argentine national that "Quieto" had been executed. Members of the Committee revealed that "Quieto" had been alive as of the evening of January 14, 1976. Based on the information furnished, it was the assumption of the Committee that "Quieto" had not been executed.

Two memorandums received by the Security Office from Lt. Col. Jack Smith, Milgrp, were made available to the Committee and are quoted below:

January 12: This date at approximately 10:15 hours, unknown male arrived at the headquarters of the U.S. Army Section located in the Comando in Jefe 250 Azopardo and inquired if that office (which is located on the second floor) needed additional security. The person acting as a receptionist, Enrique Bullrich, was suspicious of the inquiry. He asked if the man had identification and had proceeded upstairs through the MPs. The man replied that he had not but wanted to know only if the office wanted additional security. Bullrich directed the man downstairs to check in with the MPs and as the man departed he replied, "Well I really wanted the Chilean delegation".

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January 15. At 9.35 hours this date the above mentioned departed his quarters at 316 Fernandez Sprio, Acassuso, in a Ford Falcon Station Wagon to go to Martinez. I drove my car East on Fernandez-Sprio and did not turn right on Lopez y Planes because that is a congested area and a dangerous point to enter Avenida Libertador. I proceeded one block further to Martin Coronado and began to turn right in order to approach Libertador. As I turned right, parked to my left and facing North (in the opposite direction from which my car was oriented) was a dark green Ford Falcon, dirty, new with a license plate which began with a C and occupied by three males. As soon as my car began to turn right the other car immediately began to proceed North. It appeared that the presence of my car caused the other car to leave. The three occupants of the car were young (between 20 and 26) with open shirts, long hair and obviously were not those normally encountered in this area. The bodyguard who accompanies me does not believe that they are private bodyguards and he further indicates from his experience in the zone that he did not recognize any of the faces. It was apparent to both my bodyguard and myself that these three people were located on that street for some other reason than simply to be waiting in a parked car. We called control on the radio and within two minutes two radio cars were in front of my house and the zone was reconned and subject automobile could not be found. Control inquired of several malls and people in the area and to their knowledge there is no privately employed custodia for any of the immediate inhabitants of the area.

In addition to the above, Colonel Smith advised that he had visited his newly acquired quarters approximately 25 times in 25 days. He stated that some of the trips to his quarters had been made from Army HQ while some were made from the Embassy and it was possible he could have been picked up and followed to the living quarters.

The Milgrp Commander recommended that Colonel Smith remain in his hotel until appropriate security measures (necessary door and window locks, etc.) were completely installed in the house. In addition, he recommended that a guard be placed on the quarters for a 24-hour period.

The Watch Committee concurred with the recommendations of the Commander of the Milgrp.

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IV On January 19, 1976, the Watch Committee was convened with the following attending: A/DCM and representatives from ADMIN, ECON, DEA, POL, [REDACTED] DAO, MILGRP, CONS, and SY

E025x1

Milgrp representative advised that the IG inspection team apparently acting on the message from post, had cancelled its visit for January 26. The Committee was requested to consider the possibility of proposing to the inspection team that they reestablish their plans for a visit to Buenos Aires.

Recommendation Committee recommended that a message be sent requesting IG inspection team to reschedule their trip for Buenos Aires on January 26. In addition it was to be noted that if conditions worsened, the trip could be cancelled at any time.

RSO advised the Committee that it was known that the student directory at the Lincoln School had been used as a source of information for terrorist elements. This particular publication contains the name of the staff member and child, staff member's position at the Embassy, home address and home telephone number.

One Committee member advised that he thought possibly publications from such organizations as the American Women's Club, University Women's Group, etc could contain similar information. A suggestion was made that only phone numbers should be entered in these publications. RSO pointed out that a residence phone number published without the address provided little or no security. Published in Buenos Aires and already available are reverse listings and should an individual have the telephone number, the address can be extracted from the reverse directory. Another suggestion was made that all addresses and phone numbers of Embassy personnel be totally eliminated from the Lincoln School directory. Several members of the Committee objected to this, advising that it would make it difficult for their family and children to participate in such things as the scouting movement, little league baseball and other school related activities. Members of the Committee did agree that distribution of the publication could not be controlled since non-U.S. Embassy employees are provided copies of the directory.

Recommendation: The Committee recommended that the RSO contact the school administrator and request his support in

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deleting from the directory everything except the student's name and his home telephone number. It was also recommended that any Embassy staff member could have this information deleted from the directory by sending a formal letter of request to the school.

It was suggested that the radio call sign list which reflects the call sign of all Embassy employees, employee's last name, address and telephone number, and department assigned, be reprinted and distributed to each American member of the Embassy by number in order to control the distribution.

Recommendation The Committee recommended that the above suggestion be adopted.

The meeting was closed by the Chairman.

V. On January 27, 1976 a Watch Committee meeting was called to order by the A/DCM with the following agencies or sections represented POL CONS, MILGRP. EO25x1

Milgrp Commander brought before the Committee the suggestion that Lt. Cols Smith and Gracy be permitted to move back into their homes from the hotels. Smith indicated that he had already returned to his home but that Gracy remained in the hotel.

Recommendation The Committee recommended that both members of the Milgrp return to their homes from the hotels.

Commander of the Milgrp brought before the Committee for consideration the bodyguards assigned to Lt. Cols. Smith and Gracy. It was pointed out that both these individuals occupy highly sensitive positions and spend much of their working day in the Argentine Army Annex which does not have very stringent security measures.

Recommendation. The Committee recommended that the bodyguards assigned to Cols Smith and Gracy be retained.

Special security measures which had been enacted as a result of the January 13th Security Watch Committee meeting were brought under discussion. The fact that these measures (i.e. 3 additional patrol cars for the purpose of providing escort services) had been established for a two week period was considered. The pros and cons of continuing the special measures or eliminating them were discussed.

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The fact that no information had been received during the two week period which would indicate that the level of the threat had decreased was a factor brought to light

Recommendation. The Committee recommended that the special augmentation of the security element, three patrol cars, be continued for an additional week and that during this time an attempt would be made to assess the level of the threat

At this point the Ambassador joined the meeting. He presented to the Committee State cable #283548, subject - U.S. Policies During Abductions of Americans. He requested the Committee to consider the telegram and make any recommendations it felt necessary for inclusion in a message to the Department

The RSO indicated that he strongly believed that the Department should consider taking a position on U.S. companies paying ransom for kidnap victims. It was pointed out that the paying of such ransom has not only a national but a moral implication that the money paid to terrorists in countries such as Argentina is used to finance other terrorist actions, supplying arms and bringing about the deaths of countless other people.

The Consular General expressed his support of this opinion and further stated that he felt it would be appropriate for companies paying such ransom to be fined by the U.S. Government.

He further stated that consideration should be given to bringing about an IRS ruling which would preclude such companies from gaining any tax benefit from paying the ransom

Recommendation. The Committee recommended that the RSO prepare a proposal to be forwarded to the Department concerning the Department taking a position in opposition to American companies paying blackmail money in terrorist kidnappings

The meeting was adjourned

VI. On February 3, 1976 the Watch Committee was convened with the A/DCM as Chairman. Representatives of the following agencies or sections attended: POL [redacted] LEGATT, DEA, DAO, MILGRP, ADMIN and SY. EO25x1

The initial item considered by the Committee was whether the extra security precautions, three patrol cars and bodyguards for Lt. Cols. Smith and Gracy, [redacted] Pol. Couns. Smith, Cons. Gen. Huey should be continued. The RSO explained that

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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a decision had to be made whether or not to retain these additional services permanently because the contract guard service had strained its resources to the limit in providing the service for the three week period. It was pointed out that should the additional services be required, an additional 21 men would have to be hired by the guard service. Should these additional people be hired and perform duties for one day, and subsequently be discharged, it would be necessary for the Embassy to pay for their services for a 4 month period, according to Argentine law.

Recommendation The Committee recommended that the three additional patrol cars be eliminated. In addition, it was recommended that bodyguards on Lt. Cols. Gracy and Smith, [redacted] Cons. Gen. Huey and Pol. Couns W. Smith be eliminated.

Committee members were informed that the Embassy had received a bomb threat and the meeting was adjourned.

VII On February 4, 1976 the Watch Committee was convened by the A/DCM. The following sections and agencies were represented POL [redacted] MILGRP, DAO, DEA, ADMIN and SY. EO25x1

The Chairman, A/DCM, opened the meeting by making the following general recommendations.

- 1) Accept the principle that roving patrols can replace a system of a mixture of static guards and roving patrols with the understanding that individual agencies can pay for exceptions;
- 2) Direct contract guard service not to hire additional personnel,
- 3) Temporarily cancel additional roving patrols which were implemented 3 weeks ago for escort service,
- 4) Cancel static guards immediately on all dwellings in the suburbs except those specified by heads of agencies to the SY Office,
- 5) Direct the contract guard service to construct a mobile patrol service providing escort service and making every effort to use personnel who had been relieved from static guard duties. Individuals who could not make the transition would be terminated,
- 6) Cancel bodyguards on [redacted] and two MILGRP officers,
- 7) Maintain one bodyguard on the Cons. Gen. and the Chief of the political section

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA

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The question was raised before the Committee as to whether anything was available in writing whereby the Department or any other agency had directed a cutting back in security funds. The heads of the agencies present revealed such instructions had not been received from their headquarters in writing.

MILGRP Commander stated that until more information was produced indicating that such instructions had been received, it was his desire to retain the static guards and keep the present security system in force. He further stated that members of his unit had advised him that prior to departing for Buenos Aires, their respective military elements had promised them bodyguards and/or house guards. These individuals indicated that should such be removed, they would be requesting transfers from Buenos Aires for themselves and their dependents. He stated it was the general opinion that with the removal of the static guards security would be decreased.

The Chairman brought to the group's attention the fact that it should focus first on the dropping of the special measures, three mobile patrol cars and bodyguards, which had been initiated 3 weeks previously.

Recommendation. The Committee recommended dropping the guard service which had been started 3 weeks previously (January 13). In addition, it recommended that the security system remain as it had been prior to the institution of the additional patrol cars and that static guards not be removed. The meeting was adjourned.

VIII. On February 12, 1976 the Security Watch Committee was convened by the A/DCM with the following agencies or sections present. CONS, USIS, ADMIN, [REDACTED] DAO, MILGRP, GSO, and SY. EO25x1

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss a new contract guard system, total mobile force, which had been supplied to Committee members by memorandum dated February 10, 1976 (Attachment No. 1).

The general discussion considered such items as the cutback in response time to quarters by the increased mobile patrol, elimination of target visibility by removal of static guards,

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the making available to staff members a mobile escort service to and from their quarters; the increasing frequency in which guard vehicles would pass in front of individual quarters, a more heavily armed force which could respond to problems at staff houses, and types of alarms that could be used between houses and mobile patrols. It was the opinion of the Committee that more information was needed on cost factors

Recommendation. The Committee recommended that Budget and Fiscal prepare more extensive cost factors of the recommended mobile system as they would pertain to specific agencies.

The RSO raised the question of consolidating Embassy personnel into staff housing for greater security. He pointed out that by using the staff housing method, employed successfully in other countries, the Security Office believed a greater degree of security could be obtained at much less cost. In addition, it was pointed out that the recommended mobile patrol system would reduce security costs approximately \$237,000 annually

Recommendation. The Committee recommended against staff housing as an improved security measure. In general, the Committee's position was that staff housing would not necessarily bring about improved security conditions.

IX. On February 18, 1976, the Security Watch Committee was convened by the A/DCM, presiding as Chairman. The following individuals and representatives of sections or agencies were present: Ambassador, DAO, ADMIN, MILGRP, LEGATT, ECON, USIS, NCOIC, MSG, POL and SY.

EO25x1

Initial item brought before the Committee was material found in a terrorist operational center which were believed to concern the American Embassy and its staff

- a) U.S. diplomatic list, current spring 1975, reflecting Embassy staff member and position,
- b) U.S. diplomatic list, believed current in 1967,
- c) list of GOA law enforcement personnel trained by AID, initially prepared in U.S. Embassy and reflecting updated material as recently as 18 months ago;
- d) photograph of Ambassador and Mrs. Hill talking with Foreign Minister Vignez,
- e) list of service stations used by U.S. MILGRP vehicles,
- f) copy of letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Buenos Aires,

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- g) list of license plates used by U S MILGRP cars prepared on Embassy stationery,
- h) call signs and address location used by Embassy prior to the spring of 1974,
- i) movements of an officer, A. Hollis, during a specific period in 1970;
- j)

EO25x1

- k) a reprint of an article dealing with a U.S. Air Force group which had been stationed in Mendoza for a short period of time.

The LEGATT suggested that much of the material could have come from the holding up of an Embassy MILGRP security patrol car in the early 1970's. He stated that such had occurred and that such documents as the call signs were known to be in the patrol car at the time. In general, the Committee agreed that the material taken from the terrorist operation unit was out of date except for the 1975 diplomatic list. Examination of the photograph of this particular list revealed that the actual document copied apparently was the draft of the list which was published by the GOA Foreign Office. The consensus was that though the information was old, it would indicate a considerable effort was being made to collect information on Embassy personnel. This, coupled with the fact that the actual document confiscated by the police was a micro-film, lent credence to the fact that a distinct effort was being directed toward Embassy personnel.

One Committee member pointed out that he had information indicating that the terrorists were planning action against Embassy personnel to include the Chancery, Residence and our new construction site. Also, that it had been reported the terrorists considered the congestion of the present Chancery location is to their advantage.

Based on the information furnished, the RSO made the following suggestions to the Committee to improve security measures at the Chancery.

- a) a contract guard be posted on the present Chancery roof 24 hours a day
- b) the furniture be removed from the outer lobby/reception area and a gate, controlled by an electric lock, be installed in order to prevent visitors from surrounding the guard conducting examinations of parcels and individuals; the electric lock for this gate to be controlled by the receptionist,

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- c) an electric lock be installed on the bulletproof glass doors which would be controlled by the Marine Guard who would not admit individuals until they had been cleared by the contract guard,
- d) return to use of the double door system at the vehicle entrance ramp to preclude entrance being gained to the Chancery,
- e) the Security Office be authorized to obtain the necessary personnel, scuba diver if necessary, to examine the cavities underneath the present Chancery To date ADMIN has been unable to obtain blueprints identifying the size and purpose of these cavities
- f) all individuals not currently on active duty with the USG and who could not furnish identification of such, be under escort while in the building and, if necessary, the present 3 escorts be increased to 5

A general discussion on these topics followed which resulted in the following recommendations

- a) a contract guard be placed on the roof of the Chancery and this position established as a 24 hour post,
- b) the furniture be removed from the outer lobby, access control barrier be constructed with electric lock controlled by receptionist, and electric lock controlled by MSG be placed on bulletproof doors,
- c) the Embassy return to the double door system in controlling vehicular entrance and exit,
- d) the necessary effort be made to examine the cavities under the Chancery, and
- e) that individuals, other than active duty USG employees, be under escort while in the building, and the present escort service not be increased unless such was found to be necessary

The next item brought before the Committee was a dinner-dance which had been planned by Ambassador and Mrs. Hill for all U.S. personnel on February 25, 1976

Recommendation. The Ambassador to be advised that the Committee recommended against holding the dinner-dance at this time.

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EO25x1

X On February 25, 1976 the Security Watch Committee was convened by the A/DCM Representatives from the following agencies and sections attended MILGRP, [REDACTED] DAO, DEA, ADMIN, POL, ECON and SY

The Ambassador announced that the Department had proposed the assignment of Maxwell Chaplin as DCM in Buenos Aires. The Ambassador advised that Mr Chaplin was expected to arrive at post on or about March 15. The Ambassador informed the Committee that his initial views concerning the proposed change in the security system had been made known to both the A/DCM and Acting Counselor for ADMIN. He requested that, if necessary, his views be presented to the group during the course of the discussion. The Ambassador departed the meeting following his comments.

The initial topic taken under consideration was the proposed change in the contract security guard program as applied to the Embassy staff. This program had previously been recommended by the Security Office (Attachment No 1 dated 2/10/76). In summary this proposal encompassed the converting of the present mobile patrol/static guard system to a total mobile force. The recommendation proposed a four-car system in the suburbs, a three-car system in the Federal Capital and a supervisory car providing control of both elements. The recommendation noted that if the static guards were completely deleted and the mobile patrol system installed, a savings of approximately \$237,000 would be realized in security expenditures. The determination as to static guards on individual quarters was left to the individual agencies.

When the proposal was initially brought to the attention of the Watch Committee, the Committee requested a breakdown by agency of the shared administrative cost which would result from the activation of the mobile patrol system. Added to the memorandum dated February 10, 1976 is the estimated specific cost per agency, as prepared by Budget and Fiscal. This cost analysis was supplied to each member of the Committee.

The A/DCM stated he felt the Committee should note the fact that any elevation in security cost factors at the post could be received negatively by Washington and that the Department's response to such an action could result in a recommended drawdown of staff.

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Following the DCM's remarks, the Security Officer advised the Committee that in spite of budget considerations he had the responsibility of recommending to the Committee measures to provide protection for staff members. It was also pointed out that the security program is not uniform. For example, security efforts are heavier in the suburbs than in the Capital; the degree of security provided single staff members is a great deal less than that provided staff accompanied by dependents, and individual staff members have commented on these factors to the Security Officer.

The recommended revised system was taken under discussion by the Committee. [REDACTED] MILGRP representatives pointed out that the proposed system had been discussed with members of their groups. Their members felt that the static guards on individual residences should not be discontinued; that the profile of a residence which had a static guard would seriously be changed with his removal. In addition, it was noted that individual staff members accustomed to static guards would feel that their security was being reduced should these positions be deleted. Further, it was the opinion of MILGRP members that the static guard offered a greater degree of security since he was permanently located at the residence; was familiar with its occupants, servants and visitors; was cognizant of the neighbors, familiar with automobiles associated with the environment, and was on the outside of the house to give warning to the occupants in the event of a problem.

The Security Officer brought to the Committee's attention the fact that there was always a trade-off in a change of security procedures. It was explained that, based on existing records, the proposed patrol system could be expected to result in a patrol car passing in front of each house in the suburbs 26 or more times in any given 24-hour period. (Estimate based on current pattern which averages 14 times daily.) In addition, the Committee was advised that under the proposed system response time to any house to meet an emergency was estimated at approximately three minutes or less. (Estimate based on current data recording response time between points and reduced in proportion to the number of patrol cars.) It was pointed out that under the recommended system, armament of cars would be increased to provide a responding force with a greater weapon capability. The Committee was advised that the escort service of individuals leaving or returning to

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quarters could be resumed under the recommendation. Historically, with respect to the U S community, kidnappings had normally taken place when an individual was leaving or returning to his quarters or place of business. It was the opinion of the Security Office that these were the most critical points in an individual's security. The point was also presented that in the case of the kidnapping and murder of Egan, the dissident group, upon arriving at Egan's home, had attempted to find and eliminate the static guard. Also brought before the Committee was the fact that should a commando type effort be made on a quarters in which dissident elements employed a group of 10-15 individuals, the static guard would be virtually useless from a defensive point of view

[] MILGRP members noted that they considered the escort service essential. [] further stated that they had made use of the existing patrol for escort purposes and questioned that such service was not now available

The Security Office advised that a review of the present patrol car logs revealed that patrol cars were being pulled out of their zones for 45 minutes or more in order to perform escort duties for single automobiles. It was further stated that approximately one-third of the individuals residing in the suburbs do not have static guards on their quarters and that the removal of any one of the three existing patrol cars reduces the security for all individuals concerned in order to provide protection for a single member. The Security Officer also stated that he could not support this policy and that escort service could not be provided under the existing system

[] MILGRP stated they would recommend increasing the patrol system in the suburbs in order to obtain escort service. The Committee was also advised that both units would observe the new patrol service in the suburbs and that if their staffs felt the patrol service was adequate, then a procedure for removing the static guards from the individual quarters and reducing the individual agency's cost would be placed in effect. The Security Office pointed out that the purpose of recommending the total mobile force was to reduce static guards, provide more uniform security, and make available an escort service. The Committee was advised that implementation of the recommended patrol system, without the reduction of static guards, would bring about an approximate \$80,000 increase in the annual security cost

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Recommendation The Committee unanimously approved the recommendation that the patrol service in the suburbs be increased from its present three to four cars with reinforced personnel as defined in Attachment 1, with no reduction in static guards at this time.

The recommendation of the Security Office pertaining to the revision of the system in the Federal Capital, as outlined in Attachment 1, was brought under discussion. The Security Office pointed out that within the Federal Capital there are 52 different residences of which 8 are individual dwellings. As contained in the recommendation, the Committee was advised that the present single patrol car, supported part-time by a supervisory car, be increased to a three car system. One patrol would operate north of the Spanish Monument located on Sarmiento Street, a second patrol car would operate south of the Monument. The third unit would be free lance, operating across both zones and providing support as needed. In addition, the Committee was advised that these cars would provide escort service to members traveling in automobiles, and transport service to staff members desiring to be carried to train stations, bus stops or subway stations. The recommendation was discussed in conjunction with the cost factor as outlined in Attachment 1. It was the general consensus of the Committee that escort service was not desired nor would be used by staff members residing in the Federal Capital. The Counselor for Political Affairs departed the meeting to discuss the escort provisions with secretaries employed in the Political Section. He returned to the meeting and advised the Committee that the secretaries in his section did not desire or see the need for an escort service.

The Security Officer pointed out the fact that 52 of the 87 dwellings used by the Embassy were located in the Federal Capital; that it was felt the Embassy should have a uniform protection plan for all personnel and that the recommended patrol service was believed to be necessary by the Security Office.

A general discussion ensued concerning the rapid response times of Federal Police in cases where they had been summoned. It was revealed that Federal Police had been able to respond almost immediately to any request for assistance and that such responses have been in three to five minutes. Members

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of the Committee also pointed out that due to the dispersion of staff members within the Federal Capital (most live in apartment buildings located in the downtown areas), the increase of the patrol system in the Federal Capital did not in effect improve security conditions. It was further stated that the present patrol system was felt to be adequate for the Federal Capital and no increase in patrols was necessary

FO25x1 [redacted] pointed out to the Committee that he felt the Embassy should provide uniform protective security measures for the staff

Recommendation It was the recommendation of the Committee that the patrol system within the Federal Capital not be increased and that the present system being used be retained. [redacted] the Supervising Security Officer dissented on the recommendation and requested that this be contained in the minutes of the meeting

The Security Officer brought to the attention of the Committee the fact that both TCU and the C & R Section had been contacted concerning a 24-hour roof guard on top of the Chancery. The Committee was advised that neither objected to the guard post and felt that in light of the existing threat it would not pose an extensive problem with communication efforts or make such vulnerable to penetration.

Recommendation: The Committee unanimously recommended that the rooftop guard position be activated as soon as possible.

The Security Officer brought before the Committee the fact that the Commercial Library was operating in the heart of the Chancery and was open to the public. The Committee was advised that the Security Officer had been approached by other staff members questioning this practice and suggesting that individuals be permitted access to the Library on an appointment basis as opposed to individuals walking in off the street. The Counselor for Economic Affairs noted that before entering the Chancery individuals were examined for weapons -- including the inspection of pocketbooks, brief cases and other parcels -- and that all such individuals were escorted to and from the Library. It was also pointed out that an alarm had been provided between the Library and the Marine post to alert the MSG's in the event an incident occurred in the Library. It was the general consensus that

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Argentina
Admin

security measures in existence in the Chancery would preclude an incident occurring in the Commercial Library. However, the Counselor for Economic Affairs advised that he would check with the Commercial Attaché to see if the Library could be effectively run on an appointment basis or what other measures might be taken.

The Security Officer brought to the Committee's attention the fact that under present policies individuals who are retired from or in some other way are connected with the U.S. Government are being permitted free access to the building. The Security Office recommended that individuals -- other than staff members, dependents and members of the U.S. Government on active duty -- be escorted while inside the Chancery.

Recommendation: The Committee unanimously approved the recommendation.

2025x1

The Acting DCM, (PAO), [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He stated that he was of the opinion that his present security measures, i.e. bodyguard, static guard on quarters, and general security at the Chancery, were adequate to meet his needs.

Recommendation: The Committee ^{was} concerned with the opinion of the PAO that his present security measures were reasonable and considered adequate to meet existing needs.

The meeting was adjourned.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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A- 67 from
Buenos Aires

Memorandum

Members Security Watch Committee
See Distribution

DATE February 10, 1976

RSO George S Beckett

SUBJECT Contract Security Guard System

A Our present system employs both static guard posts and mobile patrols. Disregarding the Official Residence, the Residence of the DCM, new and old Chancery sites, Consulate and Lincoln Center, the protective program provides coverage of staff members living quarters. The heaviest portion of the effort is in the suburban area. Cost for this system exceeds \$643,162 annually.

1) For a 24 hour post the annual cost is \$22,298 40, 16 hour posts and 14 hour posts cost \$13,854 and \$12,894 60 respectively. While the annual cost appears to be excessive, the hourly cost for the 24, 16 and 14 hour posts are \$2 58, \$2 40 and \$2 54 respectively. Due to existing Argentine labor laws, social benefits to any employee amount to 80% of the basic salary which is added to the employer cost factor. In addition, existing laws require that if an employee is terminated, though he may have worked only one day, the employer is responsible for 4 months salary.

2) Located within the suburbs are 23 guard posts, one of which is the Lincoln School. The charge for the post at the school is an SAS expenditure. The remaining 22 posts are charged individually to the agency concerned. Located in both the suburbs and the Federal Capital is a 24-hour, 5-car patrol system. In the suburbs two of these cars have been designated individual patrol beats. One car operates within the following bounds: Avenida Eduardo Costa, General Alvear, Roque Saenz Peña and Juan Diaz de Solis. The second patrol's area is bound by Avenida Eduardo Costa, General Alvear, Juan Diaz de Solis and Capt J Bermudez. Attached as enclosures are the schedules of frequencies at which each car passed each domicile. These frequencies are actual and were extracted from the logs of the patrol cars. The domicile is identified as the objective. Also reflected in the attachment is the estimated response time to various domiciles from indicated locations which are the results of actual tests.

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Contract Security Guard System

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Pg 2 of 8
Encl No 1

3) Supporting these 2 patrol elements is a sub-supervisory car which (unannounced) roams through the suburban and Federal Capital area checking guard posts and mobile units to ensure that they are performing correctly. In addition, this vehicle furnishes response to emergency conditions in support of the routine patrols.

4) In the Federal Capital, a third patrol element exists. This element furnishes similar support to the Federal Capital and responds to emergency situations. The fifth car is a car which does not operate on any fixed schedule but provides overall supervision of the system during different periods of each day. It does not function on a 24-hour basis.

5) In the past, certain members have made use of the patrol cars as escort vehicles. Since all moves of the patrol cars are recorded on the daily log of the car, a review of the log reflects the amount of time expended in supporting any given individual. Example: A staff member requested escort service (this does not include the period or trips which were made during the time the additional vehicles were working as escorts) from Libertador. He requested the vehicle to meet him at a specific location. The patrol vehicle proceeded to Libertador, picked up the staff member and escorted him to his residence. Lapsed time in waiting for this individual and performing the movement required 45 minutes. This removed the protective vehicle from its zone of responsibility for the 45 minutes, leaving the homes in that area without a roving patrol. Such services cannot be provided under the existing system.

B. The Security Office is proposing the following for consideration by the Watch Committee as an alternate to the present system. The proposal amounts to a total mobile guard force. (Static guards would only be provided an individual agency by request. Mobile force would be SAS.) The suburban area will be broken down into three individual patrol zones. Zone "A" will be bound by Avenida Eduardo Costa, Juan Diaz de Solis, Roque Saenz Peña, Pueyrredon and Gran Pueyrredon. Zone "B" Pueyrredon to Gran Pueyrredon, Juan Diaz de Solis, Avenida Eduardo Costa and General Pacheco. Zone "C" General Pacheco, Juan Diaz de Solis, Avenida Eduardo Costa and Capt J Bermudez.

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Contract Security Guard System

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Encl No 1

1) Each zone will have assigned a permanent mobile patrol consisting of 2 men. The patrol will operate 24 hours a day. A supervisory/free zone patrol car will be permanently assigned to the 3 zones and will rove at will. This car will function as a supervisory element and will also provide backup in emergencies. The car will be manned with 3 individual

2) In the Federal Capital, 2 zones will be established. The area north of Sarmiento Avenue (parallel to the Zoo) will be one security area and south of Sarmiento will be a second. A patrol car consisting of 3 men will be assigned to each of these areas and will perform the same functions as the cars in the suburbs. A sixth car consisting of two men will perform the duty of an overall supervisory element over both the suburbs and the Capital. It will also act as a backup car during emergencies.

C. Based on figures furnished by the contracting guard service, it is estimated that the cost of the recommended patrol service will be \$405,331.20 as opposed to the current system of static plus mobile guards at a cost of \$643,162.00. Assuming estimates and other factors are reasonably close to the operational figure, an obvious \$237,830.80 will be saved annually. The savings will occur primarily as the result of the reduction of personnel. The present system requires 102 people where the revised system will require approximately 69. Cost factors as indicated do not include any reduction in guard staffs of the facilities identified in paragraph A nor a reduction in the radio communication capability. The objectives of the recommendation are to bring about a more evenly distributed security system, providing a greater degree of protection and reduced cost. Of course, since the costs for the recommended system will be SAS chargeable, which will be computed on the number of individuals receiving the service, cost to each agency above this will increase with the assignment of private guards on individual quarters.

D. With reference to the attachments, it is the estimate of both the contract guard service and the Security Office that patrol frequency time to quarters, should the recommended system be accepted, will be double of that indicated. In other words, if the patrol car is passing a given point 15 times in a 24-hour period, it can be expected that the same point will probably be passed 30 times in the same period. It is also felt that response times as indicated by the attachments will be cut in half.

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Contract Security Guard System

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Encl No 1

E. The B & F Office has prepared a summary of projections of cost, using the present system, which has been attached for your information

F. A Watch Committee meeting will be requested to discuss this proposal. You will be notified by the DCM's office of the date of the meeting

Attachments

- 1 Mobile India
- 2 Mobile Golf
- 3 Memorandum Security Expenditures
FY 1974 and 1975

Distribution

AMB
DCM
Cons Gen
Couns Pol Aff
Couns ECOM
Couns ADMIN
DAO
LEGATT
POL-R
USIS
DEA
MLGRP
GSO
B & F

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2/9 /76

Encl No 1

Buenos Aires A

av 6/2/76

Saturday 7/2/76

Sunday 8/2/76

100	1400	2200	Total	0600	1100	2200	Total	0600	1400	2200	Total	Observaciones
to	to	to	24 hs.	to	to	to	24 hs.	to	to	to	24 hs.	
0600	2200	0600		1100	2200	0600		1400	2200	0600		
este	objetivo	no se	recorre									
4	5	4	13	4	5	5	14	5	6	6	17	
7	3	6	16	8	6	6	20	6	7	7	20	
6	3	5	14	6	5	6	17	7	6	5	18	
6	3	5	14	5	6	7	18	6	5	7	18	
7	5	6	18	7	6	6	19	7	6	3	16	
5	6	4	15	6	6	5	17	6	5	5	16	
6	4	5	15	6	5	6	17	7	6	5	18	
5	6	6	17	5	6	5	16	6	7	4	17	
5	6	4	15	6	6	5	17	6	5	5	16	
to	perroting	on	this	objective								
4	5	5	14	6	5	7	18	7	6	6	19	
6	3	5	14	6	6	6	18	7	7	6	20	
7	4	6	17	7	6	6	19	6	6	7	19	
8	5	4	17	9	6	6	21	6	7	7	20	
4	5	4	13	4	5	6	15	7	6	6	19	
3	5	4	12	6	5	5	16	7	7	6	20	
4	5	5	14	4	5	5	14	6	7	5	18	
4	4	6	14	4	5	4	13	7	6	7	20	
4	5	3	12	6	6	6	18	3	5	4	12	
1	5	4	12	3	5	4	12	6	6	6	18	
98	87	91	276	108	105	106	319	118	116	107	341	

estimated time in minutes between objectives obeying traffic regulations

Estimated time in minutes	Location	Object	de	1.33	15	3'	6/14
40	14	4'	de	1.29	19	2'	"
4	20	3'	"	9	10	"	24 Gaucha 3' "
35	23	4'	"	31	7	1'	" 18 28 2' 14/22
5	24	3'	"	24	14	4'	" 1.35 10 5' "
4	24	3'	"	1.35	10	3'	" 1.24 15 3' 22/6
19	2'	"	14	24	3'	"	39 19 3' "

trated time to/from objectives 10 and 12 are considered with railway barriers open

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MOBIL INDIA

6/2/76				Saturday 7/2/76				Sunday 8/2/76				Observaciones
1400	2200	Total		0600	1400	2200	Total	0600	1400	2200	Total	
to	to	24 hs		to	to	to	24 hs	to	to	to	24 hs	
1400	2700	0600		1400	2200	0600		1400	2200	0600		
6	4	13		4	5	6	15	5	7	7	19	
6	5	16		5	6	6	17	6	5	5	16	
7	7	20		5	5	7	17	6	6	6	18	
7	6	19		5	6	7	18	6	5	5	16	
6	4	13		4	5	6	15	6	5	5	16	
7	5	14		4	6	6	16	7	7	7	21	
6	5	15		4	5	5	14	6	7	7	20	
6	4	15		4	6	4	14	5	5	5	15	
6	4	11		4	6	6	16	5	4	6	15	
5	7	19		5	5	7	17	6	6	7	19	
6	7	17		5	6	7	18	5	7	7	19	
6	5	15		5	6	5	16	6	4	6	16	
6	5	15		2	6	5	13	4	5	6	15	
6	6	15		5	6	6	17	6	5	5	16	
6	7	17		5	6	6	17	6	5	6	17	
7	5	18		5	5	5	15	6	4	4	14	
6	5	14		3	5	6	14	6	4	4	14	
6	5	15		5	6	6	17	5	5	6	16	
174	111	96		79	101	106	286	102	96	104	302	

Estimated time in minutes between objectives observing traffic regulations -

27	hasta	30	2'	desde	30	hasta	7	3'	desde	8	26	3'	6/1
45	"	20	5'	"	8	"	27	3'	"	10	26	3'	"
25	"	30	5'	"	31	"	25	5'	"	21	26	3'	14/2
YPF	"	30	6'	"	21	"	28	3'	"	30	44	4'	"
20	"	25	4'	"	40	"	44	3'	"	45	20	5'	22/6
10	"	26	3'	"	30	"	31	1'	"	30	9	4'	"

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ESTIMATED SECURITY EXPENDITURES FOR FY 1976, AS OF FEBRUARY 7, 1976. Encl. No. 1
Buenos Aires A-67

TOTAL	STATE SHARED	STATE BASIC	USIA	LEGATT	DEFDAS	MILGRP	DEA	FASTP	AID	FAS	FAA	AEC
100%	11.6%	25.6%	7.0%	4.6%	16.3%	25.6%	9.3%					
43	5	11	3	2	7	11	4					
<u>PATROL SERVICES</u>												
Houses/Emb Patrol												
Estimated FY 1976 cost												
Patrol Drivers												
Gas, oil, R/M Patrol Cars												
100%	3.9%	34.6%	7.7%	3.5%	11.5%	30.8%	7.7%					
26	1	9	2	1	3	8	2					
Provincial Police/Houses												
Estimated FY 1976 cost												
100%	36.1%	30.8%	7.5%	3.0%	8.3%	10.5%	3.8%					
133	48	41	10	4	11	14	5					
Radio Net S W Radios used by												
Tent												
Inst./Maint.												
Radio Control Ctr.												
100%	35.1%	25.0%	16.1%	1.8%	8.0%	3.7%	4.2%					
2.8%	1.8%	1.3%	0.2%									
Chancery Sq. Ftg. Occupied												
Chancery Guards												
Escorts/Visitors												
Car Ramp Guards												
Consulate Guards												
Guards for:												
Ambassador's Residence												
DCM's Residence												
DCM's Personal												
DCM's Special Guard												
Meals for Police Guards												
Political Officer												
Lebor Attache												
100%	11.1%	4.92										
22,298												
\$7,498												
\$11,100												
\$3,275												
\$24,517												
\$13,858												
\$114,682												
\$38,549												
\$57,245												
\$103,726												
\$2,000												
\$9,918												
\$37,582												
\$862												
\$951,969												
\$82,812												
\$355,384												
\$87,163												
\$14,458												
\$163,790												
\$178,404												
\$65,826												
\$2,000												
\$978												
\$629												
\$455												
\$70												

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

PROPOSED ESTIMATED SECURITY EXPENDITURES FOR FY 1976, AS OF FEBRUARY 7, 1976

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>SHARED</u>	<u>ST BASIC</u>	<u>USIA</u>	<u>LEGATT</u>	<u>DEFDAS</u>	<u>MILGRP</u>	<u>DEA</u>
<u>PROPOSED PATROL</u>								
<u>houses in suburbs</u>	100%	6%	26%	6%	6%	17%	31%	8%
	35	2	9	2	2	6	11	3
<u>estimated cost</u>	\$215,382	\$12,923	\$55,999	\$12,923	\$12,923	\$36,615	\$66,768	\$17,231
<u>residences in Fed Cap.</u>	100%	2%	5%	9%	2%	2%	8%	2%
	52	13	27	5	1	1	4	1
<u>Estimated cost</u>	\$148,487	\$37,121	\$77,213	\$13,364	\$2,970	\$2,970	\$11,879	\$2,970
<u>Estimated cost</u>	87	15	36	7	3	7	15	4
<u>Total Houses</u>	\$363,869	\$50,044	\$133,212	\$26,287	\$15,893	\$39,585	\$78,647	\$20,201

GAS NOT INCLUDED IN ABOVE COSTS (EMBASSY PAYS ALL FUEL, R/M costs present patrol)

PRESENT ESTIMATED SECURITY EXPENDITURES FOR FY 1976, AS OF FEBRUARY 7, 1976

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>SHARED</u>	<u>ST BASIC</u>	<u>USIA</u>	<u>LEGATT</u>	<u>DEFDAS</u>	<u>MILGRP</u>	<u>DEA</u>
<u>BROWN PATROL COSTS</u>								
<u>Houses</u>	43	5	11	3	2	7	11	4
<u>Estimated cost</u>	\$198,370	\$23,011	\$50,783	\$13,886	\$9,125	\$32,334	\$50,783	\$18,448
<u>PROVINCIAL POLICE COSTS</u>								
<u>Houses</u>	26	1	9	2	1	3	8	2
<u>Estimated cost</u>	\$24,000	\$936	\$8,304	\$1,848	\$912	\$2,760	\$7,392	\$1,848
<u>Gas, oil, R/M for 5 cars</u>	\$20,430	\$2,370	\$5,230	\$1,430	\$940	\$3,330	\$5,230	\$1,900
<u>EST. COST PRESENT SYSTEM</u>	\$242,800	\$26,317	\$64,317	\$17,164	\$10,977	\$38,424	\$63,405	\$22,196
<u>(Patrols only)</u>								

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RUEHOT/USUN NEW YORK//POLAD

RUSNAAA/CINCEUR//POLAD

RULPALJ/CINCSO//POLAD

RUCLMXA/AIR UNIVERSITY//STATE REP AND MR TUTTLE

RUEDARA/ARMY WAR COLLEGE//OPNS GROUP

PUEDASA/NAVY WAR COLLEGE//STATE DEPT REP

RUCI*AA/COMAC//POLAD

RUEKJCS/DIA

PUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT//ATTN MRS BECK DADS

RUEIHW/WHITE HOUSE//SIT ROOM CIEP ATTN MR DUNN

PUEOIAS/COMUSARMY FT MEADE//SPECIAL RESEARCH DET

RUCLA04/ADWC TYNDALL AFB FLA

RUEBJGA/COMDT COASTGUARD//POLAD

RUEBAT/DIRNAVINSERV

PUEHIA/USIA

PUCIP34/HQ TAC//INOV

PUEBDSB/HQS DSA//CIS

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Admiral
Security - Terrorism*

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PAGE 2 RUEAIIA 0376 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

RUCSAA7/SAC INDICATIONS CENTER

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7UHQHCA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

RUCFAAA/GSA//OFFICE OF PREPAREDNESS

RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR

PUEBWJA/IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION//R KRAMER

PUEADJU/UPIC//PB CABLES

RUCBSAA/CINCLANT//POLAD

PULPAKA/CMR 193PD INF BDE//DINTEL ONLY

PULPHIO/24 COMPW HOWARD AFB CZ//IN

RUEBSAA/COMUSNAVSOP//N 2 ONLY

RUCOPNA/CMR DEFFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CEN//PHILADELPHIA

BT

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN. CITE CIA 874346.

EO25x1

//SOUTH AMERICA: THE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS OF SEVERAL SOUT

H

AMERICA ' COUNTRIES MAY BE COOPERATING IN ACTIONS AGAINST POLITICAL
REFUGEES IN ARGENTINA.//

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 RUEAIIA 0376 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

//EARLY THIS MONTH, ARMED MEN RANSACKED THE OFFICES OF THE ARGENTINE CATHOLIC COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND STOLE RECORDS CONTAINING INFORMATION ON THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS. ARGENTINE POLICE DID NOT INVESTIGATE THE CRIME AND DISMISSED IT AS A SIMPLE ROBBERY.//

//TWO DAYS LATER, 24 URUGUAYAN AND CHILEAN REFUGEES, MANY OF WHOM WERE THE SUBJECTS OF COMMISSION FILES, WERE KIDNAPED AND TORTURED FOR SEVERAL HOURS. SOME OF THE REFUGEES LATER IDENTIFIED THEIR INTERROGATORS AS SECURITY OFFICERS FROM CHILE AND URUGUAY. PRESUMABLY, A CHILEAN-URUGUAYAN OPERATION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES.//

//IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS, TWO PROMINENT URUGUAYAN POLITICAL EXILES AND A FORMER LEFTIST PRESIDENT OF BOLIVIA HAVE BEEN KILLED UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARGENTINA. ARGENTINE MINISTER OF ECONOMY MARTINEZ DE HOZ RECENTLY TOLD THE US AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES THAT ARGENTINA WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF EX-PRESIDENT TORRES AND SPECULATED--WITHOUT PROVIDING EVIDENCE--THAT LEFTIST EXTREMISTS HAD ELIMINATED "ONE OF THEIR OWN."//

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 4 RUEAIIA 0376 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

//THERE ARE ALSO SEVERAL REPORTS THAT CHILEAN LEFTIST LEADER EDGARDO ENRIQUEZ, WHO WAS APRESTED BY ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES ON APRIL 10, WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TURNED OVER TO THE CHILEANS AND IS NOW DEAD. MEANWHILE, THE BRAZILIAN PRESS REPORTS THAT ARGENTINA HAS HANDED OVER TO CHILEAN AUTHORITIES A BRAZILIAN POLITICAL EXILE WANTED BY SANTIAGO.//

//THE ARGENTINE JUNTA HAS DENIED ALLEGATIONS THAT IT HAS VIOLATED "HUMAN RIGHTS" AND RECENTLY ISSUED AN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE DECLARING THAT IT WOULD NOT REPATRIATE REFUGEES BY FORCE. DESPITE THIS AND SIMILAR DISCLAIMERS BY RESPECTED ARGENTINE LEADERS, US EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN BUENOS AIRES SUSPECT THE ACQUIESCENCE, AND PERHAPS THE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT, OF THE ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES IN MANY OF THESE INCIDENTS.//

//IN EARLY 1974, SECURITY OFFICIALS FROM ARGENTINA, CHILE, URUGUAY, PARAGUAY, AND BOLIVIA MET IN BUENOS AIRES TO PREPARE CO-ORDINATED ACTIONS AGAINST SUBVERSIVE TARGETS. THEY AGREED TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC SECURITY LIAISON CHANNELS, TO EXCHANGE INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 5 RUEAIIA 0876 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

INFORMATION ON A REGULAR BASIS, AND TO FACILITATE THE INTERNATIONAL
MOVEMENT OF SECURITY OFFICERS ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS.//

//SINCE THEN, THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW REPORTS FROM WELL
PLACED SOURCES INDICATING THAT THE ARGENTINES HAVE CONDUCTED JOINT
COUNTERSUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS WITH THE CHILEANS AND WITH THE URU-
GUAYANS. UNTIL RECENTLY, HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS
COOPERATION WAS EXTENSIVE OR VERY EFFECTIVE. ~~(SECRET NOFORN)~~//

ARGENTINA: THE DRAFT TEXT OF ARGENTINA'S NEW FOREIGN INVEST
MENTS LAW, WHICH WAS RELEASED LAST WEEK, OSTENSIBLY DOES AWAY WITH
MOST OF THE ONEROUS RESTRICTIONS OF THE NOVEMBER 1973 LAW THAT HAD
REDUCED DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO NEAR ZERO DURING THE PAST TWO
YEARS.

THE NEW LAW WILL:

- GIVE FOREIGN INVESTORS THE SAME RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
AS DOMESTIC INVESTORS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 6 RUEAIIA 0376 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

- ELIMINATE THE RESTRICTION ON ACCESS BY FOREIGN FIRMS TO DOMESTIC CREDIT.

- REMOVE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CERTAIN FIELDS.

- REDUCE THE NUMBER OF BUSINESSES IN WHICH PRIOR GOVERNMENT APPROVAL FOR INVESTMENT IS REQUIRED.

- LIBERALIZE PROVISIONS FOR REPATRIATING CAPITAL AND PROFITS.

- REDUCE TAXES ON PROFIT REMITTANCES.

THE NEW LAW SHOULD BRING IN MORE CAPITAL FROM PRIVATE FOREIGN

N
SOURCES. BUSINESSMEN WILL PROBABLY RESPOND SLOWLY, HOWEVER, WAITING TO SEE WHETHER THE REGIME'S OTHER MEASURES IMPROVE THE OUTLOOK FOR STABILITY AND PROFITABLE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ XGDS-2.

BT

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~~SECRET~~

EO25x1

1. DISTRIBUTION

2. ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

P760 023-0342

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FROM

Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

DATE

JANUARY 1976

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SUBJECT

Security Watch Meeting
PANAMA PASS RSS

Feb. 10, 1976

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SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

1 On December 30, 1975 the Watch Committee was convened by Acting DCM Present at the meeting were the following Chief Political Section, [] Counselor for Administration, DATT, and Senior Security Officer

2 Items considered were as follows

EO25x1

a The question was raised as to the advisability of keeping the half armored cadillac that is sometimes used by the Ambassador, his family, and visiting dignitaries The fact that the car draws attention and the vulnerability because of lack of armored glass was discussed The possibility of installing bullet proof glass was mentioned but it was indicated that the age of the car was a factor against this It was noted that this particular car is due for replacement The possibility of replacing it with a fully armored car was suggested, however, the Security Officer advised such would not be possible He suggested that a partially armored car could be obtained and the glass could be installed locally

RECOMMENDATION

Obtain a replacement with as much armor as possible The Cadillac meanwhile not be used by the Ambassador or other dignitaries

Declassified Case: 17X-52366 Date: 11-02-2013

ROUTING

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FORM 0 64 D 373

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

For Department Use On

In Out

Initiated by

P50

George S

Becker

Drafting Date

1/29/76

Phone No

148

Content and Classification Approved by

RCHill

Acting DCM HWoodward

Buenos Aires A-40

A
2~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b [REDACTED] the RSO opened discussion on boating activities by staff members. Some discussion arose as to whether officers should fall under the prohibition of boating activities. Everyone agreed no patterns should be established in this matter. It was indicated that terrorists had attacked high ranking officials while they were on water trips and such should be remembered when accepting invitations from high ranking Argentine officials who may be under surveillance. The possibility of those Americans who might own boats falling into patterns was discussed. The risks of boating over horseback riding, golfing, etc. were discussed. There was general agreement that any stepped up terrorist activity could result in further risk.

RECOMMENDATION

A general notice on recreational activities and security procedures should be issued. Suggested it be divided into routine for work and routine for recreational diversions.

C General questions concerning travel were directed to the RSO. These were answered and the Committee was advised that travel restriction directives would be reissued at the beginning of the year. The matter of travel of official personnel from other Embassies was brought up. Despite the restriction of official travel it was noted that individuals from other embassies traveled here quite frequently under tourist visa. Since the Department, in response to an AFSA protest, has stated that we cannot prevent employees from coming here as tourists with regular passports, it was suggested that if people from other embassies traveled as tourists they should, for security reasons, avoid associating themselves with the Embassy. Thus, they ordinarily should not be allowed the privileges of commissary, services, etc. of the Embassy. The pros and cons of this practice were considered, we sometimes use other Embassies' services when traveling on leave.

RECOMMENDATION

A telegram should be sent explaining the policy of the Embassy towards official personnel traveling in Argentina as tourists. This policy would be minimal contact with the Embassy in B A. They should conduct themselves as tourists. This does not include the requirements of Army Regulation 630-5, app B, which would require all military personnel visiting foreign countries to communicate with army attaché at the American Embassy in the country visited.

The attention of the leaders of the Montoneros in Buenos Aires was called to the question of the possibility of the risk.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Bureau memo A 70

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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3

to American staff members. Since the whereabouts of this person and his condition are unknown it was suggested staff personnel be advised of the matter.

RECOMMENDATION

That a security notice be issued immediately reiterating the necessity of caution because of this incident.

[Handwritten signature]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIRGRAM

PW60112-0455

RS/R REP AF ARA

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AL 101

TO, Department of State, Washington DC

DEPT PASS ERDA, NSF, NRC

P O. 11652 GDS

TAGS PIN, SHUM, TPHY, AR

FROM Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

DATE July 20, 1976

SUBJECT Firing and Imprisonment of CNEA Employee- Antonio Misetich

REF Buenos Aires 3013

AAA

Attached to this Airgram is a free translation of the text of an order issued by Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission President Carlos Castro Madero in the Misetich case

We have learned that Misetich did have some close connections with terrorist groups. His sister was reportedly married to a terrorist. In addition, when the Campora government in May 1973 dismissed long-time CNEA President Oscar Quihillalt, the terrorist group proposed Misetich to replace him, and he nearly made it. The moderates rather hurriedly rallied support for Iraclogoit, as a Peronist who was not an extremist, and, so we were told, managed to sell this to Campora, although it was a close call

HILL

Declassified Case: 17- 22366 Date: 11-02-2013

Jul 21 8 28 AM 1976

Date

Initials

FORM 10 64 DS 323

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

For Department Use Only

17 In 17 Out

Drafted by

JCI RHW:cox arb

Drafting Date

7/2/76

Phone No

377

Contents and Classification Approved by

AMB ARCHILL

Clearance

POI W.Smith LPS

A/DCM WBeal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

N. 51-00000 - 5/12/66

In view of Law No 21,274 and

CONSIDERING

that this law authorizes under Article 2 the President of the National Atomic Energy Commission to drop personnel which are found to be involved in the causes stipulated therein,

that under Article 6 of this law, there is established, in addition, definite situations which can originate the dismissal of such personnel without revoking the right to receive indemnification for such action,

that review in this Institution (discloses) an employee who should be dismissed for being included in what is stipulated by Article 6, clause 6), of this law

Therefore

THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RESOLVES

1 to dismiss as of April 19, 1976, Doctor Antonio-Anselmo MISETICH of the Department of Research, using the faculties authorized under Article 2 of Law 21,274 and because of being understood (guilty) of causes foreseen in Article 6, clause 6, of that law

2 In accordance with the causes which motivate the dismissal, the employee will have no right to receive indemnity based on the action taken in 1

3 It is established that the dismissal mentioned above, is made in accordance with the terms of Law 21,289

4 Done

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 01 100803 0304Z 212224Z

SI
ACTION ARA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-02 SEC-03 VOICE-04 USIA-05 INRL-06 CIAZ-07
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DOTE-02 /371 V

O 212215Z MAY 76
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3009

~~SECRET~~ BUENOS AIRES 3424

F. O. 11652: EXEMPTION CATEGORY 30 (C) (2)
TAGS: ASCE; ZAIR, PHS, AR, ARA, VP
SUBJECT: PROSECUTION OF SAM-7 MISSILES BY VFP AND ATTEMPTED
SABOTAGE GOA AIRCRAFT

1. EMBASSY IS IN RECEIPT OF SEVERAL REPORTS COMING FROM
VARIOUS SOURCES INDICATING THE EXISTENCE OF FROM 3 TO 30
SAM-7 MISSILES IN ARGENTINA. IT IS ALLEGED THAT THESE MISSILES
ARE IN THE HANDS OF TERRORIST ELEMENTS. CONFLICTING INFORMATION
HAS BEEN RECEIVED CONCERNING THE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE MISSILES
AGAINST VARIOUS TYPES OF AIRCRAFT. NONE OF THE REPORTED
INSTANCES HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED TO DATE.

2. REPRESENTATIVES OF GOA CONFIRMED INCREDIARY DEVICES HAD
BEEN PLACED IN SIX AIRCRAFT BELONGING TO GOA AIR FORCE.
ATTENTION INVITED TO DAO IN [REDACTED]

3. WITH RESPECT TO THE PRESENCE OF MISSILES IN ARGENTINA
DETAILED REPORT CONTAINED IN DAO IN [REDACTED] DATED MAY 2
1976.

4. LOCAL US AIRLINE COMPANIES INFORMED OF THIS POTENTIAL
THREAT.
HILL

SECRET

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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Declassified Case: DWE 52366 Date:
11-02-2013

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TO RUCADIB/DIACURIMEL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN 1153

FROM DN-2G

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

DIADIN 276-GA (AS OF: 1916 EDT 2 OCT 76)

ARGENTINA: ATTACK ON THE PRESIDENT. (U)

1. (U) A BOMB REPORTEDLY DETONATED IN A REVIEWING
STAND ONLY MOMENTS AFTER ARGENTINE PRESIDENT AND
ARMY COMMANDER JORGE VIDELA HAD LEFT. ELEMENTS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE APPARENT ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
ARE UNKNOWN, BUT LEFTIST TERRORISTS WHO HAVE BEEN

GOVERNMENT ARE SUSPECT.

2. ~~(S//NOFORN)~~ THE BOMBING WAS THE FIRST ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST VIGELA SINCE HE CAME TO POWER IN MARCH AND FOLLOWS ON THE HEELS OF SEVERAL GOVERNMENT VICTORIES AGAINST LEFTIST GUERRILLAS IN THE FIELD. THE BLAST OCCURRED INSIDE A HEAVILY GUARDED ARMY INSTALLATION WEST OF BUENOS AIRES, AND REPRESENTS AN INCREASE IN THE TERRORISTS' ABILITY TO PENETRATE ARMY SECURITY. SIGNIFICANTLY, DURING THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH HE STATED THAT THE GUERRILLAS HAD LOST THE WAR BUT "MIGHT STILL PRODUCE SOME NOTORIOUS ACTS..."

3. ~~(S//NOFORN)~~ THE ATTACK WILL LIKELY (80 PERCENT) SPARK CONTINUED ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS BY THE ARMY AND BY EXTRA-LEGAL EXTREMIST GROUPS. LAST WEEK ARMY AND SECURITY AGENTS CAPTURED A NUMBER OF LEFTIST LEADERS AND REPORTEDLY KILLED SEVERAL OTHERS. THIS ACTION FOLLOWED THE UNEXPLAINED DEATH OF SOME 30 TERRORISTS SUSPECTS BEING HELD BY FEDERAL SECURITY

PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 4574 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FORCES. SUCH HARSH MEASURES HAVE CAUSED CONTROVERSY AND DIVISION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY. MORE REPRISALS MAY INCREASE TENSION BETWEEN MODERATE AND RIGHTIST OFFICERS AND UNDERMINE THE MILITARY UNITY THAT IS VITAL IN ORDER TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE MYRIAD PROBLEMS CURRENTLY PRESSING THE GOVERNMENT.

PREPARED BY: ALERT CENTER

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC
424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FOIA(b)(2) 3.10 USC 424 - DIA, NIO and JIA

RECEIVED SA: [REDACTED]

RE PHONETIC POWER COMBAT

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FM DIA WASH DC

TO RUCRDIS/DIACRINTEL

AIG 7811

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NOFORN 6971

FROM DA-26

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

DIADIA 329-11A (AS OF: 2100 EST 24 NOV 76)

ARGENTINA: SUBVERSIVE TOLL MOUNTS. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECURITY FORCES CONTINUE TO TAKE A HEAVY TOLL OF SUBVERSIVES IN THEIR INTENSIVE ANTI-TERRORIST CAMPAIGN. SINCE THE FIRST OF NOVEMBER, 181 TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN KILLED.

2. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ THE LA PLATA AREA, SOME 60 KILOMETERS

PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 5178 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SOUTHEAST OF BUENOS AIRES, HAS BEEN THE SCENE OF UNUSUALLY HEAVY FIREFIGHTS BETWEEN PROVINCIAL POLICE AND TERRORISTS SINCE THE 9 NOVEMBER BEGINNING OF THE

INCIDENTS, 71 SUBVERSIVES HAVE BEEN KILLED WITHOUT
A SINGLE LOSS AMONG THE SECURITY FORCES. WITH THE
CONTINUING VIOLENCE, LA PLATA HAS PRACTICALLY BECOME
AN ARMED CAMP WITH MOVING SQUADS OF POLICE AND ARMY
UNITS CONTROLLING ALL ACCESS TO THE CITY AND
CONDUCTING HOUSE-TO-HOUSE CHECKS IN THEIR SEARCH FOR
SUBVERSIVES AND WEAPONS.

3. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MEANWHILE, IN THE BUENOS AIRES AREA
TERRORISTS APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN FORCED, AS A RESULT OF
HEAVY SECURITY FORCE PRESSURES IN RECENT MONTHS, TO
RESORT TO LOWER RISK, LOWER COST OPERATIONS AGAINST
BUSINESSMEN AND PROFESSIONALS. IN THE LAST THREE
MONTHS, NINE EXECUTIVES HAVE BEEN KILLED, WITH THE
APPARENT MOTIVE BEING THE BUILDING UP OF SYMPATHETIC
SUPPORT AMONG THE LABOR FORCE TO SUPPORT THE TERRORISTS.

PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 5170 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CAUSE.

4. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LEFTIST TERRORISTS HAVE SUFFERED EXTREMELY
HEAVY LOSSES SINCE THE MILITARY TOOK OVER THE GOVERNMENT
LAST MARCH, WITH MOST OF THEIR TOP LEADERS HAVING BEEN
WIPE OUT. THEIR CHANGE IN TACTICS TO THOSE OF LOW
RISK UNQUESTIONABLY REFLECTS THEIR LOSSES AND INDICATES
THEIR INABILITY TO OPENLY ENGAGE SECURITY FORCES AS
THEY DID IN THE PAST. AS LONG AS THE MILITARY
GOVERNMENT IS ABLE TO APPEASE LABOR COMPLAINTS OVER
WAGES THROUGH INCREASES, AS OCCURRED IN RECENT WEEKS,
IT IS NOT VERY LIKELY THAT THE TERRORISTS WILL HAVE ANY
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN DRAWING LABOR TO THEIR
CAUSE. IF SECURITY-FORCE PROJECTIONS ARE TRUE,
AND PROVIDING THAT LABOR CAN BE KEPT IN LINE, THE
POINT MAY BE APPROACHING WHEN LEFTIST TERRORISM WILL
BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL.

PREPARED BY [REDACTED]

REF ID: A631 DFC 32)

FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DTA, NSA and NSA

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~~SECRET 7/20/05/COGOUTRAC/441111~~ (S)

FROM 22-20

INFO: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)

MAILED 203-65 (AC OF: 1600 FOT 13 OCT 76)

ARGENTINA: VIOLATION BY THE GOVERNMENT. (S)

1. ~~(S)~~ THE LEFTIST TERRORIST MOVEMENTS COORDINATED THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF JUAN PERON'S ASCENSION TO POWER -- 17 OCTOBER 1945 -- WITH NUMEROUS BOMBINGS THROUGHOUT BUENOS AIRES. ALTHOUGH NO DEATHS WERE REPORTED, THE EXPLOSIONS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE PROPERTY DAMAGE THROUGHOUT THE CAPITAL, INCLUDING THAT TO AN OFFICIAL US EMBASSY CAR.

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TO RUEHJCS/DIACINTEL

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FROM DIA-18

SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIND) (U)

DIA IN 145-2A (AS OF: 0455 EDT 22 MAY 76)

ARGENTINA: GRAIL MISSILES REPORTED IN HANDS OF ARGENTINE
TERRORISTS (U)

1. ~~46/040000/0101~~ THREE SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THE
INTRODUCTION OF FROM THREE TO 30 MAN-PORTABLE SOVIET
SA-7/GRIL MISSILES INTO ARGENTINA. BUT NONE ARE AWARE OF
THEIR OPERATIONAL STATUS. THE MISSILES ARE REPORTEDLY
IN THE HANDS OF THE LEFTIST PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

PAGE 2 RUEHJCS 5576 1451113

(REF): IF TRUE, THEY WOULD PRESENT A GREATLY INCREASED THREAT
TO COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY AVIATION.

SA-7 SHIPMENTS CAME TO ARGENTINA
 LINA PURSUANT TO CONTACTS MADE BY THE ERP. ONE UNCONFIRMED
 VERSION OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE GRAILS STATES THEY CAME VIA THE CUBAN
 EMBASSY IN THE DIPLOMATIC MAIL. EARLIER REPORTING CLAIMED THAT
 CHILEAN OFFICIALS HAD DELIVERED A SHIPMENT TO THE ERP
 AT THE ARGENTINE-CHILEAN BORDER.

3. (C/NOPFOR/WHITEL) THOUGH ONE SOURCE CLAIMED NO PLANES HAVE
 BEEN DOWNED BY THE MISSILE,

THE JANUARY 1975 SHOOTDOWN OF AN AIR FORCE TRANSPORT WAS BY
 A HEAT-SEEKING MISSILE, LIKELY THE SA-7. ARGENTINE SECURITY
 FORCES HAVE DENIED THE TRUTH OF THIS REPORT, HOWEVER.

4. (C/NOPFOR/WHITEL) IN AN EFFORT TO COMBAT THE SA-7S
 THE AIR FORCE HAS PLACED INCENDIARY DEVICES ABOARD SIX

PAGE 3 JUVJGS 9576 - 20251
 OF ITS MIRAGE FIGHTERS TO LEAD THE HEAT SEEKING SA-7 MIS-
 SILE ASTRAY, AND SECURITY AT AIRPORTS NEAR THE CAPITAL IS
 REPORTED AT AN ALLTIME HIGH. THE SUCCESS OF THE SA-7 MIS-
 SILE HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN AFRICA AND VIETNAM, WHERE
 PLANES MAKING LOW-LEVEL RUNS AND TAKING OFF OR LANDING WERE
 MOST VULNERABLE. THEIR USE IN ARGENTINA, SERVICED BY INTER-
 NATIONAL AIRLINES, ADDS A NEW DIMENSION TO TERRORISM THERE AND
 RAISES THE SPECTRE OF SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED] ALERT CENTER

(KRG-2 DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION OF ORIGINATOR)

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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TO RUHQDIP/DIACORINTEL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RUHQDIP/DIACORINTEL 4934

FROM DIA-1A

RRHHVY SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (C)

DIADIN 145-17A (AS OF: 1945 EDT 24 MAY 76)

ARGENTINA: TERRORISTS REPORTEDLY HAVE SA-7/GRAIL MISSILES. (C)

THIS DIN REPLACES DIADIN 145-2A, DTG 221101Z MAY 76, CITE

NOBBEN 7389, WHICH SHOULD BE DESTROYED.

1. ~~(C) RUHQDIP/DIACORINTEL~~ SEVERAL SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THAT THE
LEFTIST PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (LPR) HAS RECEIVED FROM THREE
TO 12 SA-7/GRAIL SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES OVER THE LAST SEVERAL

PAGE 2 HUPKJCS 9747 (C) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

YEARS. IF SO, THIS WOULD BE A THREAT TO COMMERCIAL AND MILI-
TARY AVIATION.

2. ~~(C) RUHQDIP/DIACORINTEL~~ TWO MISSILES OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY

ARGENTINA AS THE RESULT OF CONTACTS MADE BY THE ERP. ONE UN-
CONFIRMED VERSION IS THAT THE GRAILS WERE BROUGHT INTO THE
COUNTRY BY THE CUBAN EMBASSY VIA DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS. EAR-
LIER REPORTING CLAIMED THAT CHILEAN LEFTISTS HAD DELIVERED A
SHIPMENT TO THE ERP AT THE ARGENTINE-CHILEAN BORDER.

3. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ TO DATE, GRAIL MISSILES HAVE ALMOST
CERTAINLY NOT BEEN USED AGAINST ANY ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT, AL-
THOUGH SEVERAL PLANES HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN DESTROYED UNDER
MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. WHILE THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE MIS-
SILE IS NOT IN ARGENTINA, THE LACK OF CONFIRMATION IS IM-
PLIFIED BY CONTINUING REPORTS OF THE WEAPON'S PRESENCE IN
THE COUNTRY. AS A PRECAUTION, THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE IS
MAXIMIZING AIRPORT SECURITY -- ESPECIALLY AT INTERNATIONAL

PAGE 3 RUEKJCS 5747 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FACILITIES -- AND IS CLOSELY MONITORING DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS.

4. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ IF THESE WEAPONS ARE OPERATIONAL AND
IN THE HANDS OF TRAINED OPERATORS, CIVIL AND MILITARY AIR-
CRAFT COULD BE VULNERABLE TO ATTACK DURING LOW ALTITUDE
FLIGHT, INCLUDING LANDINGS AND TAKEOFFS. HOWEVER, IN VIEW
OF INCREASED AIRFIELD SECURITY AND A STEEPENING CAMPAIGN
SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN IN WHICH A LARGE NUMBER OF LEFTISTS
HAVE BEEN EITHER KILLED OR CAPTURED, THE THREAT TO AIRCRAFT
IS ESTIMATED TO BE LOW (20 PERCENT).

PREPARED BY: [REDACTED] DIN-78

(X) 3-2 DECLASSIFY UPON NOTIFICATION OF ORIGINATOR

ET FOIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NSA

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